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Abstract
We consider networks of queues in which the independent operators of individual queues
may cooperate to reduce the amount of waiting. More specifically, we focus on Jackson
networks in which the total capacity of the servers can be redistributed over all queues
in any desired way. If we associate a cost to waiting that is linear in the queue lengths,
it is known how the operators should share the available service capacity to minimize the
long run total cost.
We answer the question whether or not (the operators of) the individual queues will
indeed cooperate in this way, and if so, how they will share the cost in the new situation.
One of the results is an explicit cost allocation that is beneficial for all operators. The
approach used also works for other cost functions, such as the server utilization.
Keywords: Jackson network, cooperation, cost allocation, game theory, capacity allocation.
1 Introduction
Consider a queueing network consisting of different queues, and assume that each of these
is operated by a different, independent operator. By working together (in some way), the
operators can optimize the performance of the network (in some sense), leading to a social
optimum with minimum total cost for the operators. On the other hand, individual operators
will try to minimize their own cost, and will only cooperate if this is to their own benefit.
This explains our idea of analyzing such networks using cooperative game theory.
In particular, we can view the independent operators as decision makers (or players) in
a so-called cooperative cost game, see e.g. [10]. In such a game, the players make binding
agreements (as opposed to noncooperative games) to jointly optimize the total cost they need
to pay, and then try to share this cost by finding a fair cost allocation. Typically, a cost
allocation is fair if it lowers the cost for each possible coalition (i.e. for any group of players).
If this is not the case, then full cooperation is not beneficial, but there may still be partial
cooperation between some (but not all) players.
When we try to model a queueing network as described above, there are a number of
choices to be made. First of all, (i) one can think of a variety of ways in which the operators
may work together, including sharing service capacity, sharing buffer capacity, or changing the
routing structure; moreover any of these can be done dynamically or statically (i.e. dependent
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on the current state of the network or not). Furthermore, (ii) different network topologies
may be considered. Similarly, (iii) traffic characteristics, i.e. the behaviour of the arrival
process(es) and service demands, can be modeled in many ways. Finally, (iv) the performance
of the total network and its individual queues, and the associated cost, can be measured in
many ways.
In this paper we study an initial model to investigate whether this line of research is
useful to pursue. In this model we make the following assumptions: (i) the different servers
are able to share their service capacity, and do so in a static way; (ii, iii) the network is an
n-node Jackson network, see e.g. [13]: customers arrive to (some of the) nodes according to
independent Poisson processes, then (after service) move to another queue, according to some
routing probabilities, etcetera, until they leave the system; service times are all exponentially
distibuted; (iv) we take the cost at queue i to be proportional to the long run expected
queue length, or equivalently (by Little’s law), proportional to the expected sojourn time of
customers in queue i; furthermore, the total cost of a group of queues is just the sum of the
costs of the individual queues (thus, there is no cost associated to the cooperation itself).
In earlier work [12] we treated a special case of our Jackson model, in which the network
is a traditional tandem queue. We found that even this very elementary model exhibits some
interesting and non-trivial behavior. In the current paper we treat the more general model,
but also find better results. In particular we present a cost allocation which is shown to be
beneficial for all operators.
In the queueing literature there are many references in which the queues in a network
cooperate (sharing capacity, pooling resources, etc.) to reach some form of optimality, e.g.
[2, 9]. However, in most cases the whole network is (implicitly) supposed to be run by a single
operator. The combination of the queueing model with game theory, in which independent
operators are only willing to cooperate if a good cost allocation can be found while they remain
independent, is to the best of our knowledge hardly studied so far. Some related references are
the following. Gonza´lez and Herrero [7] study several medical departments that may share an
operating theatre. The cost of each department is linear in the capacity needed to satisfy a
maximum on the expected waiting time of its patients. It is shown that cooperation reduces
the total cost, and that a cost allocation can be determined based on the Shapley value. In [4],
Garc´ıa-Sanz et al. extend this model and study cooperation among Markovian queues that
share a common server with preemptive priority discipline. The authors show that a cost
allocation proportional to the arrival rates is fair. More recently, Anily and Haviv [3] study
cooperation in service capacity management. A number of servers pool their capacities and
customers. The cost of cooperation is the mean number of customers in the pooled system.
It is shown that fair cost allocations always exist. In particular, servers with large capacities
may receive payment for cooperation. In these three papers, the servers cooperate by means
of pooling. One way in which our paper contributes is that we consider cooperation in a
network of queues, while preserving the autonomy of the individual queues; we do not allow
for pooling.
In [5] cooperative game theory is used to study resource allocation in dynamic ad-hoc
networks, assuming that the cost function is superadditive. We also like to mention [6] where
a cooperative game is considered in which countries can form coalitions to optimize the routing
of (international) teletraffic streams. For a trial data set they identify the most important
members of the possible coalitions and the way in which benefits could be shared. Finally,
we mention Altman et al. [1] who give an extensive survey on networking games. The models
and papers discussed in this reference mostly deal with non-cooperative game theory, the only
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exception being a short section focused on bargaining games. This strengthens our belief that
the problem formulation and approach in the current paper have not been studied before.
We end this section with a short overview of the remainder of the paper: in Section 2
we introduce the model in more detail with the optimal capacity allocation, and recall the
basics of cooperative game theory. Based on this we introduce the so-called Jackson games.
Then, in Section 3 we first derive results for two- and three-node Jackson games, followed by
an explicit cost allocation in Theorem 8, showing that the core is never empty. In Section 4
we focus on a special case, viz. the tandem games as earlier presented in [12], and on an
extension in which we choose the server utilization, rather than the expected queue length,
as performance measure. We conclude in Section 5, also sketching some main lines for future
research.
2 Model and preliminaries
In this section we first introduce our model in detail, and derive the optimal capacity alloca-
tion. Then we recall the basics of cooperative game theory, focusing on the solution concept
of the core, which is the set of all cost allocations that are acceptable to all possible coali-
tions of queues. The last subsection shows how our Jackson model fits into the framework of
cooperative game theory.
2.1 Model
We consider an n-node Jackson network, denoting the set of all queues by N = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
External customers arrive at queue i according to a Poisson process with rate λ0i . After
finishing its service at queue i, any customer joins queue j with probability pij independent of
all else, and leaves the network with probability 1−∑j∈N pij . We are only concerned with the
local arrival rates λi to queue i, which follow from the traffic equations λj = λ
0
j +
∑
i∈N pijλi
for all j ∈ N . The exponential service capacity at queue i is given by µi, where we assume
µi > λi. The cost incurred at queue i is represented by the long run expected queue length
λi/(µi − λi). Furthermore, the total cost of any subset S ⊆ N of queues is the sum of the
costs of the individual queues in S.
Importantly, we assume that the queues in any subset S may cooperate to improve their
performance and save on costs. Cooperation here means that the queues in S may redistribute
their service capacities among each other. Denoting the service capacity of queue i after
redistribution by mi, this leads to the following optimization problem for the set S:
min
mi,i∈S
∑
i∈S
λi
mi − λi (1)
s.t.
∑
i∈S
mi =
∑
i∈S
µi.
To solve this problem, rewrite it as
min
α,mi,i∈S
∑
i∈S
λi
mi − λi − α
(∑
i∈S
mi −
∑
i∈S
µi
)
,
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where α is the Lagrange multiplier. Taking derivatives leads to the solution [8, p. 63]
mi,S = λi +
√
λi∑
k∈S
√
λk
∑
k∈S
(µk − λk) i ∈ S, (2)
which is denoted by mi,S to stress the dependence on the set S. In this solution, the total
excess capacity
∑
k∈S(µk − λk) is distributed proportional to the square root of the demand
rate. The corresponding minimal cost for the set S of (cooperating) queues is
c(S) =
(
∑
k∈S
√
λk)
2∑
k∈S(µk − λk)
. (3)
Notice that queue i contributes the amount
√
λi
∑
k∈S
√
λk/
∑
k∈S(µk−λk) to the cost for S.
2.2 Preliminaries on cooperative cost games
A cooperative cost game is represented by a pair (N, c). The set N = {1, . . . , n} is the set
of players. A coalition S is a (nonempty) group of players, that is, a nonempty subset of N .
The cost function c assigns to each coalition S a certain cost c(S).
In our analysis we will need the concept of marginal vectors, and monotonicity. Let
σ = σ(1) . . . σ(n) be a permutation of the player set, where σ(k) is the player in position k.
Denote by Pσ(i) = {j ∈ N |σ−1(j) < σ−1(i)} the set of players in positions before player i.
Now imagine that the players enter a room one by one in the ordering indicated by σ, and
that each player has to pay the marginal contribution to the total cost when he enters the
room. Then player i pays
mσi = c(Pσ(i) ∪ {i})− c(Pσ(i)).
The vector mσ = (mσ
1
, . . . ,mσn) is called the marginal vector corresponding to the permuta-
tion σ. Further, a cost game is called monotone increasing (respectively decreasing) if S ⊆ T
implies c(S) ≤ c(T ) (respectively c(S) ≥ c(T )).
A game is additive if the coalitional costs are additive, c(S) =
∑
k∈S c({k}). If for any
two disjoint coalitions S and T of players it is beneficial to cooperate, we say the game is
subadditive. In this case, cooperation never leads to higher cost when compared to working
separately:
c(S ∪ T ) ≤ c(S) + c(T ). (4)
Remark 1. Notice that in a subadditive game the choice T = N \ S in (4) implies c(N) ≤
c(S) + c(N \ S). Thus, if we split the coalition N of all players in two parts, namely the
coalitions S and N \ S, then the total cost does not decrease. This is an incentive for all the
players in coalition N to cooperate. 
The main question that remains is how the total joint cost c(N) should be allocated
among the players. A first step towards selecting a good and fair cost allocation is to consider
allocations in the core C(N, c) of the game (N, c), which is defined as
C(N, c) =
{
y ∈ RN
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈N
yi = c(N);
∑
i∈S
yi ≤ c(S) for all S ⊂ N
}
.
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If the cost is allocated among the players according to an allocation in the core, then any
coalition S pays at most its own costs c(S). Hence, no coalition has an incentive to break up
the cooperation with coalition N .
We are now ready to view the Jackson network problem as a cooperative cost game.
2.3 Jackson games
Based on the optimal capacity allocation of a group of queues in our n-node Jackson network,
see Subsection 2.1, we define a corresponding cooperative cost game. From now on we refer
to this game as a Jackson game.
Definition. A Jackson game is a cost game (N, c) with the set of queues N = {1, . . . , n} as
player set. The cost c(S) of coalition S ⊆ N is given by (3).
For each queue in a Jackson game, we define the relative excess capacity value, or simply
r-value, as the value of the excess capacity, relative to the square root of the arrival rate, i.e.,
ri =
µi − λi√
λi
, i ∈ N. (5)
We also generalize this concept by defining the r-value of a coalition T as
r¯T =
∑
i∈T (µi − λi)∑
i∈T
√
λi
, T ⊆ N. (6)
Notice that r¯T can be seen as the weighted average of the r-values of the queues in T , where
the weights are the square roots of the arrival rates, i.e.,
r¯T =
∑
i∈T
√
λi∑
k∈T
√
λk
ri.
Proposition 1. The following properties hold.
(i) Jackson games are not monotone decreasing.
(ii) For all n ≥ 2, n-node Jackson games may or may not be monotone increasing.
(iii) Jackson games are subadditive.
Proof. For (i), assume without loss of generality that r1 ≤ r2, and let T = {1, 2} and
S = {2}. Then we have
r¯T =
√
λ1√
λ1 +
√
λ2
r1 +
√
λ2√
λ1 +
√
λ2
r2 ≤ r2,
and hence
c(S) =
√
λ2
r2
<
√
λ1 +
√
λ2
r2
≤
√
λ1 +
√
λ2
r¯T
= c(T ).
To prove (ii), we construct two concrete examples. A (non-trivial) example of an n-node
monotone increasing Jackson game can be found by choosing the capacities sufficiently close
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together, e.g. take λi = 1 and all µi inside the interval [2 − ε, 2 + ε] for some ε > 0. Then
the cost of any k-node coalition lies inside [k/(1 + ε), k/(1 − ε)]. By taking ε < 1/(2k + 1)
we can ensure that these intervals do not overlap for different k ≤ n. On the other hand, any
n-node Jackson game with λ1 = λ2 = λ and µ2 > 3µ1 − 2λ is not monotone increasing since
for T = {1, 2} we have c(T ) = 2λ/(µ¯T − λ) < λ/(µ1 − λ) = c({1}) with µ¯T =
∑
i∈T µi/|T |
the average capacity of queues in coalition T .
To prove (iii) we observe that optimal capacity allocations for coalitions S and T induce
a feasible capacity allocation for coalition S ∪ T in optimization problem (1). 
The fact that Jackson games are usually not monotone is not helpful for the analysis of the
core. Before we move on to this in Section 3, we present some weaker monotonicity results. In
the following proposition we show that the total cost of any coalition may increase or decrease
by adding queues with respectively sufficiently low or high capacity to the coalition.
Proposition 2. Consider two coalitions S and T satisfying S ⊆ T ⊆ N . Then c(S) ≤ c(T )
is equivalent with
r¯T\S ≤
(
1 +
∑
k∈T
√
λk∑
k∈S
√
λk
)
r¯S . (7)
In the particular case where T \ S only contains a single node, say T = S ∪ {i} with i /∈ S,
we have the following.
(i) A simple sufficient condition for c(S) ≤ c(T ) (increasing cost when adding queue i to S)
is given by ri ≤ 2r¯S.
(ii) When |S| > 2 a simple sufficient condition for c(S) > c(T ) (decreasing cost when adding
queue i to S) is that both ri > 3r¯S and
√
λi ≤
∑
k∈S
√
λk hold.
Proof. First, we derive
r¯T =
∑
k∈S
√
λk∑
k∈T
√
λk
r¯S +
∑
k∈T\S
√
λk∑
k∈T
√
λk
r¯T\S .
Further, the inequality c(S) ≤ c(T ) is equivalent to∑
k∈S
√
λkr¯T ≤
∑
k∈T
√
λkr¯S ,
or,
∑
k∈S
√
λk
(∑
k∈S
√
λk∑
k∈T
√
λk
r¯S +
∑
k∈T\S
√
λk∑
k∈T
√
λk
r¯T\S
)
≤
∑
k∈T
√
λkr¯S .
Solving for r¯T\S leads to (7). Statements (i) and (ii) follow immediately. 
As mentioned before, in the next section we study the core of Jackson games. In particular
we want to know if fair cost allocations always exist. That is, if the core is always a nonempty
set.
3 Main results
In this section we first derive results on the core of two- and three-node networks. Then we
point out how larger networks differ from three-node networks, and present results for these
networks.
3.1 Two-node Jackson games
For two-node Jackson games, we have the following result.
Theorem 3. Jackson games corresponding to two-node networks have a nonempty core.
Proof. This follows immediately from the subadditivity property (4) of Jackson games, see
Remark 1. 
We give an example to illustrate that the core can easily be found explicitly in this case.
Example 1. Consider a two-node network with arrival rates λ1 = 1, λ2 = 4, and service rates
µ1 = µ2 = 5. The costs of the coalitions are c({1}) = 1/4, c({2}) = 4, and c(N) = 9/5. By
Theorem 3 cooperation is worthwhile since cost savings are achieved: c(N) < c({1})+c({2}).
The core of the game is nonempty and equals
C(N, c) = {(x, 9/5− x) |−11/5 ≤ x ≤ 1/4} . 
Notice that in this example there exist core allocations such that the cost allocated to the
first queue is negative, for example (−11/5, 4). In such allocations the second queue gets paid
for its cooperation. Note that the first queue has the largest excess capacity; its contribution
is so valuable that this queue may receive payment to cooperate. This phenomenon is not
always present, e.g. when µ1 = 2, we get c({1}) = 1, c({2}) = 4, c(N) = 9/2 and C(N, c) =
{(x, 9/2− x) |1/2 ≤ x ≤ 1} .
3.2 Three-node Jackson games
All the results in this subsection are based on orderings of the r-values of the queues. First,
we identify two cost allocations that belong to the core.
Theorem 4. Jackson games corresponding to three-node networks have a nonempty core. In
particular, if we assume without loss of generality that1
r1 ≥ r2 ≥ r3, (8)
and σ(1) = 2, i.e. queue 2 is in first position, then the marginal vector mσ(c) is a cost
allocation that belongs to the core of the game.
Proof. There are two marginal vectors in which node 2 is in first position, namely m213(c)
and m231(c). Consider the first marginal vector. The marginal contributions of the nodes are
m2131 (c) = c({1, 2})− c({2}),
m2132 (c) = c({2}),
m2133 (c) = c(N)− c({1, 2}).
We proceed by checking the core-conditions:
1If two or three queues have equal r-value, either of these can be chosen as ‘the’ queue with middle r-value.
7
• m213
1
(c) ≤ c({1}): true by subadditivity;
• m213
2
(c) ≤ c({2}): true (with equality);
• m213
3
(c) ≤ c({3}): true by subadditivity;
• m213
1
(c) +m213
2
(c) ≤ c({1, 2}): true (with equality);
• m213
1
(c) +m213
3
(c) ≤ c({1, 3}): true by subadditivity;
• m213
2
(c) +m213
3
(c) ≤ c({2, 3}): see below;
• m213
1
(c) +m213
2
(c) +m213
3
(c) = c(N): true.
It remains to prove the condition related to coalition {2, 3}, which can be written as
c({2}) + c(N)− c({1, 2}) ≤ c({2, 3}), (9)
or as (
λ2
x2
)
+
(
λ1
x¯1
+
λ2
x¯2
+
λ3
x¯3
)
≤
(
λ1
xˆ1
+
λ2
xˆ2
)
+
(
λ2
xˇ2
+
λ3
xˇ3
)
, (10)
where we define (recall also (2)),
xi = µi − λi, i = 1, 2, 3,
x¯i = mi,{1,2,3} − λi, i = 1, 2, 3,
xˆi = mi,{1,2} − λi, i = 1, 2,
xˇi = mi,{2,3} − λi, i = 2, 3.
The interpretation of these quantities is that
xi is the excess capacity for queue i when considered in isolation (without cooperation),
x¯i is the excess capacity for queue i for the optimal capacity allocation in coalition {1, 2, 3},
xˆi is the excess capacity for queue i for the optimal capacity allocation in coalition {1, 2},
xˇi is the excess capacity for queue i for the optimal capacity allocation in coalition {2, 3}.
For xˆ2 we can write, based on (2),
xˆ2 =
√
λ2√
λ1 +
√
λ2
(µ1 − λ1 + µ2 − λ2)
=
√
λ2√
λ1 +
√
λ2
(x1 + x2)
≥ x2,
where we used x1
√
λ2 ≥ x2
√
λ1, which is due to the ordering in (8). Similarly, we have
xˇ2 ≤ x2. As for x¯1, x¯2, x¯3, they satisfy x¯1+ x¯2+ x¯3 = x1+ x2+ x3 and x¯i+λi, i = 1, 2, 3, are
the optimal solution to (1) for S = N . Now we consider a suboptimal solution to this, given
by
x˜1 = xˆ1, x˜2 = xˆ2 + xˇ2 − x2, x˜3 = xˇ3.
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Notice that indeed x˜1 + x˜2 + x˜3 = x1 + x2 + x3 as should, because xˆ1 + xˆ2 = x1 + x2 and
xˇ2 + xˇ3 = x2 + x3. Furthermore we have x˜2 = xˆ2− (x2− xˇ2) ≤ xˆ2 and similarly x˜2 ≥ xˇ2. We
can now prove (10) as follows,(
λ2
x2
)
+
(
λ1
x¯1
+
λ2
x¯2
+
λ3
x¯3
)
≤ λ2
x2
+
λ1
x˜1
+
λ2
x˜2
+
λ3
x˜3
=
λ2
x2
+
λ1
xˆ1
+
λ2
x˜2
+
λ3
xˇ3
≤ λ2
xˆ2
+
λ1
xˆ1
+
λ2
xˇ2
+
λ3
xˇ3
,
where the first inequality is due to the optimality of x¯i+ λi, i = 1, 2, 3, in (1) for S = N , and
the second inequality is due to the convexity of the function λ2/x in x and the fact that both
x2 and x˜2 lie in the interval [xˇ2, xˆ2].
For the second marginal vector m231(c), the marginal contributions of the nodes are
m2131 (c) = c(N)− c({2, 3}),
m2132 (c) = c({2}),
m2133 (c) = c({2, 3})− c({2}).
As above, the core-conditions can be checked to hold, either with equality, or by subadditivity.
The only exception is the condition related to coalition {1, 2}: c(N) − c({2, 3}) + c({2}) ≤
c({1, 2}), which is equivalent to (9) and therefore also holds. This proves the result. 
The theorem above shows that also three-node Jackson games have a nonempty core.
Notice that any convex combination of the two above-mentioned marginal vectors also belongs
to the core because this is a convex set.
Cost allocations in the core of three-node Jackson games may have negative elements
— the corresponding queue receives payment to cooperate — as was the case for two-node
networks. For example, consider the situation in Example 1, and add a third queue with
demand rate λ3 = 4 and capacity µ3 = 5. According to Theorem 4, the cost allocation
m321(c) = (−23/6, 4, 4) belongs to the core of the game. Node 1 has the largest excess service
capacity, and may be paid for cooperation.
The two particular cost allocations identified in Theorem 4 are such that the queue with
middle r-value does not gain from cooperation. That is, the cost that is allocated to this
queue is the same as its stand-alone cost c({i}). Below we characterize the conditions under
which all cost allocations in the core have this property.
Proposition 5. Consider a three-node Jackson network. If r2 = r¯{1,3} then
1. c({2}) + c({1, 3}) = c(N),
2. c({2})/c(N) = √λ2/(
√
λ1 +
√
λ2 +
√
λ3),
3. node 2 has no strict gain from cooperation, and
4. the core C(N, c) is the convex hull of the two marginal vectors m213(c) and m231(c).
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S {1} {2} {3} {4} {1,2} {1,3} {1,4} {2,3} {2,4} {3,4}
c(S) 1/7 1/5 1/3 1 1/3 2/5 1/2 1/2 2/3 1
S {1,2,3} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} {1,2,3,4}
c(S) 3/5 9/13 9/11 1 1
Table 1: Costs of all coalitions for the game in Example 2.
Proof. Assuming r2 = r¯{1,3}, we write for the first statement
c({2}) + c({1, 3}) =
√
λ2
r2
+
√
λ1 +
√
λ3
r¯{1,3}
=
√
λ1 +
√
λ2 +
√
λ3
r¯{1,2,3}
= c(N),
where the second equality follows from
r¯{1,2,3} =
√
λ2∑
k∈N
√
λk
r2 +
√
λ1 +
√
λ3∑
k∈N
√
λk
r¯{1,3} = r2 = r¯{1,3}.
The second statement follows from
c({2})
c(N)
=
√
λ2/r2
(
√
λ1 +
√
λ2 +
√
λ3)/r¯{1,2,3}
,
again combined with r2 = r¯{1,2,3}.
For the third statement, first note that any allocation x in the core should satisfy x2 ≤
c({2}) and x1 + x3 ≤ c({1, 3}). Together with the efficiency condition x1 + x2 + x3 = c(N)
this leads to x2 = c({2}) for any allocation in the core. Hence, node 2 does not gain from
cooperation. Together with Theorem 4 this implies that any element of the core C(N, c) is a
convex combination of the two marginal vectors m213(c) and m231(c). 
Remark 2. One may be inclined to argue that when a player does not gain from cooperation,
as in the context of Proposition 5, he may refrain from cooperation to prevent extra benefit
for the other players. However, it is easy to see (from the first statement) that his decision
to cooperate or not does not affect the cost paid, or amount gained, by the other players.
3.3 Jackson games with more than three nodes
For three-node Jackson networks we showed that the core of the corresponding game is
nonempty by identifying two marginal vectors that belong to the core, see Theorem 4. This
approach cannot be extended to four-node networks, as the following example illustrates.
Example 2. Consider the four-node tandem Jackson network with arrival rates λi = 1,
i = 1, . . . , 4, and service rates µ1 = 8, µ2 = 6, µ3 = 4 and µ4 = 2. The costs of the various
coalitions in the corresponding Jackson game are given in Table 1. The 24 marginal vectors
are listed in Table 2. One can verify that none of these marginal vectors belongs to the core
of the game. However, the core of the game is nonempty since, for example, the allocation
x = (15, 180, 315, 480)/990 belongs to the core. 
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m1234 m1243 m1324 m1342 m1423 m1432 m2134 m2143 m2314 m2341 m2413 m2431
0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.133 0.133 0.100 0 0.026 0
0.190 0.190 0.400 0.182 0.192 0.182 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
0.267 0.308 0.257 0.257 0.308 0.318 0.267 0.308 0.300 0.300 0.308 0.333
0.400 0.359 0.200 0.418 0.357 0.357 0.400 0.359 0.400 0.500 0.467 0.467
m3124 m3142 m3214 m3241 m3412 m3421 m4123 m4132 m4213 m4231 m4312 m4321
0.067 0.067 0.100 0 -0.182 0 -0.500 -0.500 0.026 0 -0.182 0
0.200 0.182 0.167 0.167 0.182 0 0.192 0.182 -0.333 -0.333 0.182 0
0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.308 0.318 0.308 0.333 0 0
0.400 0.418 0.400 0.500 0.667 0.667 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 2: The 24 marginal vectors of the game in Example 2. Top to bottom entries correspond
to players 1 till 4.
We need a different approach to study the core of the four-node Jackson game. First we
show some simple structural results. If two queues i and j have equal r-values, then their
joint cost c({i, j}) is the sum of their individual costs. This follows from the more general
statement below by taking S = {i} and T = {j}:
Proposition 6. Consider an n-node Jackson network with r¯S = r¯T for some disjoint coali-
tions S, T ⊂ N,S ∩ T = ∅. Then c(S ∪ T ) = c(S) + c(T ) in the corresponding Jackson
game.
Proof. First note that r¯S∪T = r¯S = r¯T . Then
c(S ∪ T ) =
∑
i∈S∪T
√
λi
r¯S∪T
=
∑
i∈S
√
λi
r¯S
+
∑
i∈T
√
λi
r¯T
= c(S) + c(T ).

Next, if all queues have equal r-values, then there is a unique core allocation in which
each queue pays its own cost as if in isolation, proportional to the square root of the arrival
rate.
Proposition 7. Consider an n-node Jackson network in which all nodes have equal r-value,
r say. Then the core of the Jackson game consists of a single allocation x with xi = λi/(µi−
λi) =
√
λi/r for all i.
Proof. If ri = r for all i ∈ N , then also rS = r for any coalition S. Therefore the cost of
coalition S equals
c(S) =
∑
i∈S
√
λi
r¯S
=
∑
i∈S
√
λi
ri
=
∑
i∈S
λi
µi − λi =
∑
i∈S
c({i}).
The game is additive, so there is a unique core-allocation x with xi = λi/(µi−λi) for all i. 
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We now come to our final result. Assuming that for certain parameter settings the core
would be empty, we tried to numerically find such parameters. However, we always found a
small subset of allocations that satisfy all core conditions. By careful analysis we were then
able to find an explicit expression for a particular cost allocation that always seemed to be
in the core. In the theorem below we specify this allocation for general Jackson games, and
prove that indeed it always belongs to the core.
Theorem 8. Consider an n-node Jackson network. The cost allocation x with
xi =
(
2
√
λi∑
j∈N
√
λj
− µi − λi∑
j∈N (µj − λj)
)
c(N)
belongs to the core of the corresponding Jackson game. For any coalition S the cost under
this allocation is in fact strictly less than c(S), unless r¯S = r¯N .
Proof. It follows from the definition of x that this allocation is efficient, i.e.
∑
i∈N xi = c(N).
We continue by noting that the core condition for any coalition S, i.e.,
∑
i∈S xi ≤ c(S), is
equivalent to
2 ≤
∑
j∈N
√
λj∑
j∈S
√
λj
(
c(S)
c(N)
+
∑
j∈S(µj − λj)∑
j∈N (µj − λj)
)
.
Since this can be rewritten as
2 ≤ r¯N
r¯S
+
r¯S
r¯N
,
and since a+ a−1 ≥ 2 for any a > 0 (with equality holding only for a = 1), both statements
of the theorem follow. 
We note that the cost allocation in Theorem 8 may also lead to negative cost in case of
widely varying r-values. For instance, in the setting of Example 1, the resulting cost allocation
is x = (−18/75, 153/75), which has a negative cost component for queue 1.
Interestingly, the cost allocation in Theorem 8 can also be given an interpretation by
rewriting it as
xi =
λi
mi,N − λi − αN (mi,N − µi), (11)
where
αN = − (
∑
k
√
λk))
2
(
∑
k(µk − λk)2
= −1/r¯2N
is the Lagrange multiplier for the minimization problem in (1), for the grand coalition S = N .
Thus, in addition to their ‘own cost’ after the capacity reallocation, all players pay (or receive)
an additional amount which is linear in the capacity increase (or decrease) they experience,
weighted with the (negative) shadow price of one unit of capacity. In fact, the form (11) can
also be found from [11], where it is also shown that for so-called “market games”, a nonempty
core is equivalent to the game being balanced. Indeed our game is such a balanced market
game.
Based on Theorem 8, or on the above, we can conclude
Corollary 9. Jackson games always have a nonempty core.
Hence, a stable basis for cooperation always exists.
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4 Special case and extension
4.1 Tandem games
When all arrival rates are equal, λi ≡ λ, say, as is the case in a tandem queue network (see
also [12]), some of the results take on a simpler form. The role of the r-values as criterion
value for many of the results is now simply played by the excess capacities µi − λ, or indeed
by the capacities µi. For convenience sake we highlight the main results for this particular
setting.
Let |S| be the number of queues in coalition S, and µ¯S the mean capacity of the queues
in S. Then first of all, the optimal capacity allocation for coalition S is simply to share the
total capacity equally between all queues in S, so (2) becomes mi,S = µ¯S =
∑
i∈S µi/|S|,
with total cost c(S) = |S|λ/(µ¯S − λ). Next, the monotonicity condition (7) in Proposition 2
simplifies to
µ¯T\S ≤ µ¯S +
|T |
|S| (µ¯S − λ).
Theorems 3 and 4, and Propositions 5, 6 and 7 continue to hold under the same respective
assumptions, in which r-values can always be simply replaced by the corresponding µ-values
(the second statement of Proposition 5 then becomes c({2})/c(N) = 1/3). Finally, the
particular cost allocation in Theorem 8, simplifies to
xi =
(
2− µi − λ
µ¯N − λ
)
c(N)
|N | (12)
This belongs to the core of the game, and for any coalition S the cost under this allocation
is strictly less than c(S), unless µ¯S = µ¯N .
4.2 Utilization as cost
We now extend our results to a different cost structure, namely to the case in which the cost
of queue i is given by the server utilization, instead of the expected number in queue. This
may be useful when the operator is more interested in the direct cost of operation, rather
than the delay performance for the customers. Thus, we take c(i) = λi/µi and replace the
minimization problem for coalition S in (1) by
min
mi,i∈S
∑
i∈S
λi
mi
(13)
s.t.
∑
i∈S
mi =
∑
i∈S
µi, mi ≥ λi.
The second set of constraintsmi ≥ λi is included to ensure that the utilizations never exceed 1.
In fact for stability of the queue sizes we need these inequalities to be strict, but then a solution
may not exist.
Since solving the solution to this problem is cumbersome, we restrict ourselves to the
assumption that all arrival rates are equal (λi = λ, say), as in the previous subsection. The
optimal capacity allocation is then to share the total capacity equally between all queues in
S, i.e. mi,S = µ¯S =
∑
i∈S µi/|S|, where |S| is the number of queues in coalition S. Notice
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that indeed µS > λ if for all i ∈ N we have µi > λ, as we assume. The total cost for coalition
S is obviously given by c(S) = |S|λ/µ¯S .
In this setting it is possible to find a similar cost allocation that lies in the core as in
Theorem 8, or rather as in (12). It is given by
xi =
(
2− µi
µ¯N
)
c(N)
|N | .
This belongs to the core of the game, and for any coalition S the cost under this allocation
is strictly less than c(S), unless µ¯S = µ¯N .
5 Conclusions and future work
5.1 Conclusions
We considered a Jackson network of queues in which each queue has an independent operator,
and investigated whether or not these operators are willing to cooperate in order to reduce
the total waiting cost, which is linear in the expected queue lengths (or equivalently, in
the expected waiting times). Such a cooperation will involve sharing the individual service
capacities, and then dividing the resulting total cost in some way. Our main conclusions are
as follows:
• The core of the corresponding cooperative game is never empty. That is, there always
exists a cost allocation such that the (operators of the) individual queues have an
incentive to cooperate.
• One specific cost allocation has been found explicitly, see Theorem 8. This allocation is
strictly beneficial for each coalition, unless the so-called relative excess capacity value
of a coalition equals that of the grand coalition.
• The so-called relative excess capacity value, or simply r-value, as just mentioned, turns
out to be an important quantity throughout the analysis. It is defined as the (total)
excess capacity of a (coalition of) queue(s), divided by (the sum of) the square root(s)
of the arrival rate(s), see (5) and (6).
• For the case with two queues, the core can be characterized explicitly as the convex
combination of the two marginal vector allocations; for the case with three queues, the
core always contains two specific marginal vectors; for cases with more queues the core
may contain no marginal vectors at all.
• In case of large asymmetries between queues in terms of arrival and/or service rates
(more precisely, in case of large differences in r-value), core allocations can be such that
some queue(s) have negative cost. In other words, such queues may receive payment
from the other queues for the cooperation.
• Similar results are found when the cost is not based on expected waiting times or queue
lengths, but on server utilizations.
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5.2 Future work
As mentioned in the introduction, many assumptions can be done within our framework of
‘queueing network games’. In particular we intend to study another way of “sharing capacity”,
in which the routing pattern is changed such that ‘underloaded’ queues can provide service
to jobs that otherwise would have been routed to other (highly loaded) queues. Also, we will
consider dynamic ways of cooperation, and stochastic cost structures.
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